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The “impossibility proof” on unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is critically ana-
lyzed. Many possibilities for obtaining a secure bit commitment protocol are indicated, purely on
the basis of two-way quantum communications, which are not covered by the impossibility proof
formulation. They are classified under six new types of protocols, with security proofs for specific
examples on four types. Reasons for some previously failed attempts at obtaining secure protocols
are also indicated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bit commitment is a kind of a cryptographic protocol
that can serve as a building block to achieve various cryp-
tographic objectives, such as user authentication. There
is a nearly universal acceptance of the general impossibil-
ity of secure quantum bit commitment (QBC), taken to
be a consequence of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
type entanglement cheating which supposedly rules out
QBC and other quantum protocols that have been pro-
posed for various cryptographic objectives [1]. In a bit
commitment scheme, one party, Adam, provides another
party, Babe, with a piece of evidence that he has chosen
a bit b (0 or 1) which is committed to her. Later, Adam
would open the commitment by revealing the bit b to
Babe and convincing her that it is indeed the committed
bit with the evidence in her possession and whatever fur-
ther evidence Adam then provides, which she can verify.
The usual concrete example is for Adam to write down
the bit on a piece of paper, which is then locked in a safe
to be given to Babe, while keeping for himself the safe
key that can be presented later to open the commitment.
The scheme should be binding, i.e., after Babe receives
her evidence corresponding to a given bit value, Adam
should not be able to open a different one and convince
Babe to accept it. It should also be concealing, i.e., Babe
should not be able to tell from her evidence what the bit
b is. Otherwise, either Adam or Babe would be able to
cheat successfully.
In standard cryptography, secure bit commitment is to
be achieved either through a trusted third party, or by
invoking an unproved assumption concerning the com-
plexity of certain computational problems. By utilizing
quantum effects, specifically the intrinsic uncertainty of
a quantum state, various QBC schemes not involving a
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third party have been proposed to be unconditionally se-
cure, in the sense that neither Adam nor Babe could
cheat with any significant probability of success as a mat-
ter of physical laws. In 1995-1996, a supposedly general
proof of the impossibility of unconditionally secure QBC,
and the insecurity of previously proposed protocols, were
presented [2]-[6]. Henceforth it has been generally ac-
cepted that secure QBC and related objectives are im-
possible as a matter of principle [7]-[12].
There is basically just one impossibility proof (IP),
which gives the EPR attacks for the cases of equal and
unequal density operators that Babe has for the two dif-
ferent bit values. The proof purports to show that if
Babe’s successful cheating probability PBc is close to the
value 1/2, which is obtainable from pure guessing of the
bit value, then Adam’s successful cheating probability
PAc is close to the perfect value 1. This result is stronger
than the mere impossibility of unconditional security,
namely that it is impossible to have both PBc ∼ 1/2 and
PAc ∼ 0. The impossibility proof describes the EPR at-
tack on a specific type of protocols, and then argues that
all possible QBC protocols are of this type.
Typically, one would expect that a proof of impossi-
bility of carrying out some thing X would show that any
possible way of doing X would entail a feature that is log-
ically contradictory to given principles, as, for example,
in the cases of quantum no-cloning [13, 14] and von Neu-
mann’s no-hidden-variable theorem [15]. In the present
case, one may expect a proof which shows, e.g., that any
QBC protocol that is concealing is necessarily not bind-
ing. It is important for this purpose that the QBC proto-
col formulation be all-inclusive. In the absence of a proof
that all possible QBC protocols have been included in
its formulation, any impossibility proof is at best incom-
plete. Thus, a priori, there can be no general impossi-
bility proof without a mathematical characterization or
a definition of all QBC protocols. Within the framework
of two-way quantum communications between Adam and
Babe with no further constraints, which is the setting of
the IP and its EPR attack, no such definition has ever
been presented. Although one can judge whether or not
a specific protocol is a QBC protocol, similar to whether
a specific process of computation is “algorithmic” or not,
it appears prohibitively difficult to characterize mathe-
matically all QBC protocols. Just as there is no Church-
2Turing theorem, just a Church-Turing thesis, there can
be no impossibility theorem without a mathematical def-
inition of a QBC protocol.
More concretely, there are many typces of QBC pro-
tocols that are not captured by the IP formulation and
differ from each other, similar to the existence of sev-
eral types of algorithmic processes different from a Tur-
ing machine. Some of these types were described by this
author previously [16]-[18], and secure protocols can ac-
tually be found among them. As those papers, and this
one, should make clear, even if secure QBC were impossi-
ble in all of these types, the impossibility proof for each of
them would be different and would bear no resemblance
to the well-known IP. These different types of protocols
arise because only certain techniques of protocol design,
such as certain use of classical randomness in a quantum
protocol, are included in the IP formulation, which does
not show that all possible techniques have been included.
Even just for classical randomness, the different ways it
could affect a QBC protocol are not properly accounted
for. In this paper, a systematic description of some gaps
in the IP, and the corresponding opportunity for six new
protocol types, would be identified and elaborated upon.
The original IP formulation would be named Type 0,
with the new ones named Type 1 to Type 6.
In Section II, the impossibility proof is reviewed and its
scope delimited. The basis of previous incorrect claims
on the security of several different QBC protocols would
be discussed. See also Appendix A. In Section III, the
incompleteness of the IP is analyzed from a variety of
angles that lead to at least six different types of protocols
not covered by the IP formulation. They are discussed
in Section IV with security proofs given for QBC1 and
QBC2. The security proofs for QBC4 and QBC5 are
given in Refs. [19] and [20].
II. THE IMPOSSIBILITY PROOF: TYPE 0
PROTOCOLS
The impossibility proof, in its claimed generality, has
never been systematically spelled out in one place, but
the essential ideas that constitute this proof are gener-
ally agreed upon [3]-[12]. The formulation and the proof
can be cast as follows. Adam and Babe have available
to them two-way quantum communications that termi-
nate in a finite number of exchanges, during which either
party can perform any operation allowed by the laws of
quantum physics, all processes ideally accomplished with
no imperfection of any kind. During these exchanges,
Adam would have committed a bit with associated evi-
dence to Babe. It is argued that, at the end of the com-
mitment phase, there is an entangled pure state |Φb〉,
b ∈ {0, 1}, shared between Adam who possesses state
space HA, and Babe who possesses HB. For example,
if Adam sends Babe one of M possible states {|φbi〉} for
bit b with probability pbi, then
|Φb〉 =
∑
i
√
pbi|ei〉|φbi〉 (1)
with orthonormal |ei〉 ∈ HA and known |φbi〉 ∈ HB.
Adam would open by making a measurement on HA,
say {|ei〉}, communicating to Babe his result i0 and b;
then Babe would verify by measuring the corresponding
projector |φbi0〉〈φbi0 | on HB, accepting as correct only
the result 1. More generally, one may consider the whole
|Φb〉 of (1) as the state corresponding to the bit b, with
Adam sending HA to Babe upon opening, so she can
verify by projection measurement on |Φb〉〈Φb|.
When classical random numbers known only to one
party are used in the commitment, they are to be re-
placed by corresponding quantum entanglement purifi-
cation. The commitment of |φbi〉 with probability pbi in
(1) is, in fact, an example of such purification. An ex-
ample involving Babe may be a protocol [21]-[23] where
|φbi〉 in (1) is to be obtained by Adam applying unitary
operations Ubi on state |ψk〉 ∈ HB1 sent to him by Babe
with probability λk, k ∈ K, where |K| < ∞. Gener-
ally, for any random k used by Babe, it is argued that
from the doctrine of the “Church of the Larger Hilbert
Space” [10], it is to be replaced by the purification |Ψ〉
in HBα ⊗HBβ ,
|Ψ〉 =
∑
k
√
λk|ψk〉|fk〉, (2)
where |ψk〉 ∈ HBα and the |fk〉′s are complete orthonor-
mal in HBβ kept by Babe while HBα would be sent to
Adam. With such purification, it is claimed that any pro-
tocol involving classical secret parameters would become
quantum-mechanically determinate, i.e., the shared state
|Φb〉 at the end of commitment is completely known to
both parties. Note that, from (2), this means that both
{λk} and {|fk〉} are taken to be known exactly to both
Babe and Adam. The possibility that one can always
purify a classically random situation as in (2) has never
been proved, especially how it may be combined with the
following (3). It is elaborated later in this paper and in
Ref. [20], in connection with QBC1 and QBC5, that this
is generally not possible.
Why should Adam and Babe share a pure state at the
end of commitment? Any measurement followed by a
unitary operation Ul depending on the measurement re-
sult l can be equivalently described by an overall unitary
operator. Thus, if the orthonormal {|gl〉} on HC2 is mea-
sured with result l, and then Ul operates on HC1 , it is
equivalent to the unitary operation
U =
∑
l
Ul ⊗ |gl〉〈gl| (3)
onHC1⊗HC2 . It is claimed that any actual measurement
during commitment can be postponed until the opening
and the verification phases of the protocol without af-
fecting the protocol in any essential way. Actually, if
3the measurement result is announced during commitment
there is no need for (3) because the protocol state is just
indexed by the measurement result ℓ known to both par-
ties. (With the delayed measurement description, the
cheating and the opening would be quite involved and
hard to describe when the possibility of aborting a pro-
tocol is allowed. They have never been explicitly spelled
out.) In order to maintain quantum determinacy, the ex-
act {|gl〉} in (3) are taken to be known to both parties.
Let us use k to denote Babe’s secret parameter, and i
to denote Adam’s secret parameter, such as the i with
probabilities {pi} in (1). These crucial assumptions of
openly known {pi}, {λk}, {|fk〉}, and {|gl〉} are made in
the impossibility proof through the use of known fixed
quantum computers or quantum machines for data stor-
age and processing by either party [3], [6], [9, Appendix],
even though the control of such machines belongs only
to one of the parties. As it turns out, to cheat success-
fully, Adam does not need to know {|gl〉} in a careful
formulation and he does not need to know {|fk〉} in one
general class of protocols [23]. However, he does need to
know {|fk〉} in general, a fact which is exploited in our
Type 4 protocols. The general possibility of such quan-
tities being unknown or classically random to Adam is
exploited in many of our protocols. A general limitation
on the quantum purification of classical randomness is
described in our discussion of Type 3 protocols in Sec-
tion IVC.
Protocols of the form (1), where {|φbi〉} are just sent
from Adam to Babe, will be called single-stage proto-
cols. In a multiple-stage protocol, |φbi〉 becomes, for
i = {i1, . . . , in} and k = {k1, . . . , kn−1} with 2n−1 stages
in total [12]
|φbik〉 = UAbin . . . UAbi2UBk1UAbi1 |φ0〉. (4)
The initial state |φ0〉 is openly known, and the alternate
possible unitary operations by Adam and Babe, together
with their respective probabilities, are also taken to be
openly known. If the action is initiated by Babe instead
of Adam, (4) can be replaced by, for a 2n-stage protocol,
|φbik〉 = UAbin . . . UBk1 |φ0〉. (5)
Purification of the random U ’s is to be carried out as in
(2). Thus, a multi-stage protocol is equivalent to one of
the form
|Φb〉 =
∑
ik
√
pbiλk|ei〉|fk〉|φbik〉, (6)
where {pbi}, {λk}, {|φbik〉} are openly known, |ei〉 ∈ HA
controlled by Adam, |fk〉 ∈ HB1 controlled by Babe, and
|φbik〉 ∈ HB2 is the evidence Babe possesses at the end
of commitment. As in the case of quantum coin-tossing
[24] formulation, in the IP the whole state space HB2
is supposed to be passed on during each stage. As de-
scribed later, this misses the nonuniqueness associated
with passing back a portion of the space during commit-
ment or opening, as in QBC1, and the problem of the
very possibility of purification (2), as in QBC5. By writ-
ing |φbi〉 =
∑
k
√
λk|fk〉|φbik〉, (6) is also of the form (1)
with HB = HB1 ⊗ HB2 , and a multi-stage protocol is
claimed to be equivalent to a single-stage one. Indeed, it
is alternatively argued that |Φb〉 is always openly known
at the end of commitment in any multi-stage protocol
with the use of purification. Thus, it can always be rep-
resented by (1) with all the quantities involved openly
known.
With such a formulation, Babe can try to identify the
bit from ρB
b
, the marginal state of |Φb〉 on HB, by per-
forming an optimal quantum measurement that yields
the optimal cheating probability P¯Bc for her. Adam
cheats by committing |Φ0〉 and making a measurement
onHA to open i0 and b = 1. His probability of successful
cheating is computed through |Φb〉, his particular mea-
surement, and Babe’s verifying measurement; the one
optimized over all of his possible actions will be denoted
P¯Ac . For a fixed measurement basis, Adam’s cheating
can be described by a unitary operator UA on HA. His
general EPR attack goes as follows. If the protocol is
perfectly concealing, i.e, P¯Bc = 1/2, then ρ
B
0
= ρB
1
. By
writing |Φb〉 as the Schmidt decomposition on HA⊗HB,
|Φb〉 =
∑
j
√
p˜j |e˜bj〉|φ˜j〉, (7)
where |φ˜j〉 are the eigenvectors of ρBb and {|e˜bj〉} for each
b are complete orthonormal in HA, it follows that Adam
can obtain |Φ1〉 from |Φ0〉 by a local cheating transfor-
mation UA that brings {|e0j〉} to {|e1j〉}. Thus his opti-
mum cheating probability is P¯Ac = 1 in this case. More
generally, when Babe checks |Φb〉 on HA ⊗ HB, Adam
still just cheats by applying a local transformation UA
to turn |Φ0〉 to |Φ1〉, although the terminology of EPR
attack then becomes somewhat misleading.
For unconditional, rather than perfect, security, one
demands that both cheating probabilities P¯Bc − 1/2 and
P¯Ac can be made arbitarily small when a security param-
eter n is increased [3]. Thus, unconditional security is
quantitatively expressed as
(US) lim
n
P¯Bc =
1
2
, lim
n
P¯Ac = 0. (8)
The condition (8) says that, for any ǫ > 0, there exists
an n0 such that for all n > n0, P¯
B
c − 1/2 < ǫ and P¯Ac <
ǫ, to which we may refer as ǫ-concealing and ǫ-binding.
These cheating probabilities are to be computed purely
on the basis of logical and physical laws, and thus would
survive any change in technology, including an increase
in computational power. In general, one can write down
explicitly
P¯Bc =
1
4
(
2 + ‖ρB
0
− ρB
1
‖1
)
, (9)
4where ‖ · ‖1 is the trace norm, ‖τ‖1 ≡ tr(τ†τ)1/2 for a
trace-class operator τ , but the corresponding P¯Ac is more
involved. However, it may be shown that it satisfies [17]
4(1− P¯Bc )2 ≤ P¯Ac ≤ 2
√
P¯Bc (1 − P¯Bc ). (10)
The lower bound in (10) yields the following impossiblity
result given by the IP,
lim
n
P¯Bc =
1
2
⇒ lim
n
P¯Ac = 1 (11)
within its formulation [2, 21]. Condition (8) or (11) is
a continuity statement different from a point statement
P¯Bc = 1/2⇒ P¯Ac = 1. Note that the impossibility proof
makes a stronger statement than the mere impossibility
of (US), i.e., (11) is stronger than (8) not being possible.
There have been quite a few incorrect claims on ob-
taining US QBC protocols, both before and after the
appearance of the IP. In particular, two of the various
approaches that were pursued by the present author do
not work for reasons associated with the IP (see Ap-
pendix A for a summary). In the first case, also pro-
posed in different forms by several others, simple use of
classical randomness by Babe supposedly leads to dif-
ferent cheating transformations for Adam dependent on
such randomness, hence a binding protocol is obtained
after averaging over such randomness that has to be car-
ried out in evaluating P¯Ac . The purification (2) is not
attended to, in view of the “equivalence” between clas-
sical and quantum randomness via the “Church of the
Larger Hilbert Space” doctrine. However, this doctrine,
often used in the IP as in (2), is incorrect. One simple
way to see that is to observe if Adam does not entan-
gle the classical randomness, e.g., if Adam sends |φbi〉
with probability pbi instead of (1), he cannot launch en-
tanglement cheating though ρB
0
= ρB
1
still applies. Even
when the entanglement purification has been carried out,
(2) is equivalent to classically random {|ψk〉} only if the
measurement of {|fk〉} is first performed on HB2 . Other-
wise, the off-diagonal elements in ρB
b
involving |fk〉〈fk′ |
may lead to better P¯Bc in Babe’s cheating measurement
on HB1 ⊗ HB2 , as compared to the case of purely clas-
sically random {|ψk〉} with zero off-diagonal elements.
As a specific example, consider the protocol preceding
QBC5p discussed in the beginning of Ref. [20]. It is per-
fectly concealing if Babe does not entangle, but not if
she does. Other examples not involving teleportation
can also be given. Thus, there is no equivalence between
classical randomness and quantum purification. It is the
possibility of entanglement cheating by Babe, not Church
of the Larger Hilbert Space, which dictates that (1)-(2)
is the correct representation in siuch a situation. Under
such a stronger concealing condition, compared to just
classically random {|ψk〉}, Adam may indeed cheat in
accordance with IP, depending on the protocol.
The second failed approach involves various attempts
to turn a pure |Φb〉 into a mixed one through Adam’s ac-
tion during the commitment phase before opening. The
IP argues that a pure |Φb〉 can always be maintained in
principle via perfect quantum computation. While there
is no mathematical formalization on this issue that may
lead to a rigorous proof, my different attempts indeed
lead to different countermeasures by Adam, and I do not
see what next attempt to try in this approach that may
appear to have a possibility of success. However, this
strategy works on Babe’s entanglement and leads to our
QBC1. The reason is directly connected to the point
of the last paragraph, namely that Babe’s measurement
on {|fk〉} first and then on HB2 can lead to a conceal-
ing protocol even though there may be a measurement on
HB1⊗HB2 with which Babe can cheat. Thus, Babe’s en-
tanglement may be effectively “destroyed” through, e.g.,
Adam’s questioning during commitment. See the follow-
ing discussions related to QBC1 in Sections III and IV
for details.
III. PROBLEMS OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY
PROOF
A plausible first reaction to the impossibility proof is:
why are all possible QBC protocols covered by its formu-
lation? More precisely, how may one capture mathemat-
ically the necessary feature of an unconditionally secure
QBC protocol in a precise definition that is required for
the formulation and proof of a mathematical theorem
that says such a protocol is impossible? No such def-
inition is available. An analogy to a QBC protocol is
an “effectively computable” function, a function whose
value for any specific argument can be “mechanically”
obtained in a finite number of steps without the inter-
vention of “intelligence.” The well-known Church-Turing
thesis says that any effectively computable function can
be computed recursively or by a Turing machine. It can
be cast as an impossibility statement: there is no ef-
fective procedure that cannot be simulated by a Turing
machine. It was found that a function that can be com-
puted by a method that is clearly effective, such as Post
machines or Markov algorithms, is indeed also Turing-
computable. However, nobody calls the Church-Turing
thesis the Church-Turing theorem. This is because there
is no mathematical definition of an effective procedure.
The logical possibility is open that someday a procedure
is found that is intuitively or even physically effective, but
which can compute a nonrecursive arithmetical function.
Thus, in the absence of a precise definition of a QBC
protocol, one would have at best an “impossibility the-
sis,” not an impossibility theorem. (This view was em-
phasized to the author by Masanao Ozawa.) It is of-
ten difficult, if not impossible, to capture precisely by
means of a mathematical characterization a given kind
of physical operations that have unambiguous common-
sense meaning. For example, there is no definition that
would characterize all classical cryptographic protocols,
say for bit commitment. It is at least not clear why a
definition in the more general quantum case can ever be
5found. Just as there appear to be many different forms of
effective procedures, there are many different QBC pro-
tocol types that appear not to be captured by the IP
formulation. To uphold just the “impossibility thesis,”
one would need to prove that US QBC is impossible in
each of these types.
The problem of characterizing mathematically all QBC
protocols, although quite difficult, does not seem to be
as hopeless as that for an effectively computable func-
tion, if one believes that “bit commitment protocol” is
less ambiguous than “effective procedure,” even though
both concepts can presumably be recognized to be appli-
cable or not when a particular instance is presented. In
particular, the framework of two-way quantum commu-
nication, or the Yao model [25], without any constraints
of relativity or superselection rules but with the possibil-
ity of the protocol being aborted as a result of cheating
detection before opening, is an appropriate general set-
ting. (The Yao model allows actual measurements during
rounds but is often interpreted [6] to imply (5)-(6) used in
coin-tossing formulation. That would exclude the possi-
bility of sending back only part of a product space, which
is utilized in many of our US protocols.) It is sometimes
argued that every proof has to presuppose a “model,”
but the question is whether the model used in the IP is
general enough to capture all clear-cut QBC protocols
within the above framework. It is also sometimes argued
that the “community of experts in the field” have already
agreed on a “definition” of what constitutes a QBC pro-
tocol, which would rule out some of our Type 3 proto-
cols. But the question is why a clear-cut QBC protocol
should be ruled out by legislation. Note that “defini-
tion” in this context does not mean an arbitrary choice
of terminology, but a mathematical characterization of
all instances where the concept is applicable. Observe
also that this characterization problem does not arise in
security proofs, because one should be able to exhaust all
possible types of attack given a specific protocol.
The most important instances of incompleteness
of the IP and quantum coin-tossing formulations, as
presently understood by the author, are listed under
four categories in the following. Some of these have
been discussed previously [16]-[18], [21]. Some new
protocol types made possible by such gaps are discussed
in Section IV.
a. Freedom of Operation — In a two-party situation
where either one can do anything, constrained only by
physical laws, and has only his/her own interest to pro-
tect, neither can be trusted to be honest if an operation
would lead to his/her advantage without penalty. On the
other hand, a party is supposed to strive to achieve the
aim of the protocol if his/her own security against cheat-
ing by the other party can be assured. These obvious
considerations are codified as the Libertarian Principle
and the Intent Principle of protocol formation, further
elaborated in Ref. [17]. The resulting freedom of action
by either party is not accounted for in the QBC IP formu-
lation, nor in the mathematical formulations of quantum
coin-tossing protocols [24].
• Honesty and Cheating — In a multi-stage protocol,
where a state space is passed between Adam and
Babe in rounds for operations, as (5)-(6), either
party can substitute an entirely different space of
his/her own at any stage. The possible advantage
is clear in coin-tossing, and examples were given in
Ref. [23] on bit commitment. There is no mech-
anism built into the protocol formulation to pre-
vent such cheating. Fortunately, this problem can
be alleviated in two different ways [20] including
cheating detection and the possibility of aborting
the protocol, with perhaps a penalty imposed on
the party that got caught cheating with the use of
an ensemble, as described in Ref. [20] for QBC5.
However, there is still a lot of freedom left which
has not been accounted for, some to be discussed
in the following points (c) and (d).
• Random vs. Nonrandom Secret Parameters — Sup-
pose a protocol has the property that it is con-
cealing for every possible legal operation by Babe
that can be checked as mentioned above. Then
Babe is free to choose any such operation (or state)
with whatever probability distribution unknown to
Adam. This freedom, codified as the Secrecy Prin-
ciple [17], [18], is a simple corollary of the Liber-
tarian Principle and the Intent Principle. It di-
rectly contradicts the IP claim that a state is al-
ways openly known at the end of commitment in a
QBC protocol. One consequence of this freedom is
that Adam’s cheating transformations may depend
on exactly what Babe’s choice is in order to suc-
ceed. Indeed, he may not even have a single density
operator representation for each b due to the differ-
ence between a random parameter and an unknown
parameter, a distinction well-known in statistics.
Our Type 3 and Type 6 protocols arise from this
freedom, but no concrete protocol has been found
in these types that can be proved unconditionally
secure. On the other hand, with additional fea-
tures one can construct secure protocols utilizing
this freedom, as in our QBC1, QBC2, and QBC4.
• Generalizations to Imperfect Operations — Since
the final criterion in a QBC protocol involves prob-
abilities only, every step and requirement can also
be relaxed to a probabilistic, rather than a perfect
deterministic, one. For example, the verifying mea-
surement by Babe need not succeed with probabil-
ity 1. However, it seems that the relaxation should
go only so far as to the case where the probability
is arbitrarily close to 1, as in other quantum and
classical algorithms. Even though there is no proof
to the contrary, there is no known case where this
particular generalization would ever lead to a US
QBC protocol.
6b. Generality of Quantum Purification — Adam
needs to entangle his possible actions in (1) or (6) in
order to launch an EPR attack as described in the IP. It
has not been shown why all possible classically random
elements in a protocol allow quantum entanglement
purification. Indeed, when quantum teleportation in-
volving one actual measurement among different possible
spaces is utilized during commitment, as in the case of
protocol QBC5 [20], there is no quantum purification.
In a different way, this situation of no purification, or no
unique purification as in QBC1, may also obtain when a
random part of a tensor product space from one party is
to be returned to the other party, which occurs in many
of our US protocols.
c. Different Commitment Possibilities — Under
this category one may consider almost all the restric-
tions of the IP formulation that can be removed. A
particularly important example is the possible use of
multiple evidence state spaces. We have two separate
secure protocols, QBC2 and QBC4, that exploit this
possibility in different ways. Another example is the use
of quantum teleportation in our QBC5.
d. Nonuniqueness — There are various places in the
IP where uniqueness of choice is implicitly assumed; oth-
erwise the question would arise as to why a cheating
transformation UA can be found which is successful for
every possible choice. For example, the cheating proba-
bility P¯Ac depends on Babe’s verifying measurement. For
an arbitrary protocol, the IP formulation does not, and in
fact cannot, specify what the possible verifying measure-
ments could be. There is no proof given that there cannot
be more than one verifying measurement for which dif-
ferent cheating transformations are needed. When such
a situation occurs, Adam may not know which one to use
for a successful cheating. However, this gap can be closed
when the verifying measurements are perfect, i.e., the bit
is verified with probability 1 from the measurement.
A more serious situation occurs in the case of purifi-
cation (6), when there is more than one way to purify a
given classical random number. For example, the usual
multi-stage formulation of QBC and coin tossing, exem-
plified in (4)-(5), carries the implicit assumption (and re-
striction) that one fixed space is passed between the par-
ties in the rounds. But there is great utility in splitting
a classical or quantum correlated tensor product space
for obtaining security. If a random sample of m out of n
qubits are to be sent from the first party to the second
after state modulation on the m qubits, the first party
can pick any m of the n qubits and entangle/purify the
result with unitary permutation operators among all the
n qubits. Additional qubits apart from the n given ones
can also be employed with proper permutation. As a re-
sult, them qubits that are sent back can be anym-subset
of the original n qubits plus other auxiliary qubits. How-
ever, the resulting |Φb〉 of (6) would be different for dif-
ferent choices because the qubits have been individuated
by their positions, and there is no single overall purifica-
tion. Thus, there arises again the question of existence of
a uniformly successful cheating UA if concealing obtains
in each of the purifications. If the m qubits cannot be
entangled, or if their entanglement cannot be maintained
during the protocol, the possibility of uniform cheating
UA becomes the issue of the existence of irreducible resid-
ual classical randomness in the protocol that is answered
negatively in our following QBC1.
IV. SIX NEW TYPES OF PROTOCOLS
In this section we describe six different types of pro-
tocols, together with specific examples for five of them,
that are not covered by the IP for reasons expounded in
the preceding section. For four protocols, namely QBC1,
QBC2, QBC4, and QBC5, full unconditional security
proofs are available. The situation for Type 3 and Type
6 protocols is not certain. Together they should make
clear the many possibilities that are open for developing
US QBC protocols. All our protocols assume for simplic-
ity that Adam opens perfectly, i.e., with probability one,
for b = 0, as in the IP.
A. Type 1 protocols — residual classical
randomness
Type 1 protocols are defined to be those in which there
is inherent classical randomness that cannot be quantum-
mechanically purified and maintained. This classical ran-
domness is distinguished from that of a Type 3 protocol
that arises from {λk} and {|fk〉} randomness in (2). Our
three-stage protocol QBC1 provides such an example and
can be motivated as follows. It is possible to create pro-
tocols that are clearly binding; the question becomes how
to make them concealing. The main difficulty in this con-
nection is Babe’s entanglement (cheating) over the ran-
dom choices. This, it turns out, can be prevented during
cheating detection by Adam. Thus, the overall protocol
becomes both concealing and binding.
Consider a protocol in which Adam sends n0 qubits to
Babe, each randomly drawn from a set of BB84 states
S = {|1〉, |2〉, |3〉, |4〉}, 〈1|3〉 = 〈2|4〉 = 0, 〈1|2〉 = 〈3|4〉 =
1/
√
2. Babe randomly picks one and sends it back to
Adam, who modulates it by U0 = I or U1 = Rpi, the ro-
tation by π on the great circle containing S, and commits
it as evidence. He opens by telling Babe the state of each
qubit, which she verifies, telling b = 1 if the one she sent
was moved by Rpi. In a more complete protocol, Babe
would check that Adam indeed sends her states from S,
and Adam would check that Babe is sending back one
of the qubits from him. This can be carried out either
in a classical game-theoretic formulation or through an
ensemble approach described in Appendices A and B of
Ref. [20]. In any event, according to IP and all coin-
tossing formulations, both parties are assumed honest
7except that they can (and should) entangle all possibili-
ties.
The protocol is ǫ-binding regardless of whether Babe
entangles for the following reason: Adam has to know
exactly which qubit Babe sent back in order to cheat suc-
cessfully, regardless of whether or not he uses his initial
entanglement, which may involve permutations among
the n0 qubits. As just discussed in IIId, IP does not ap-
ply because he does not know which qubit Babe sends
back. He needs to turn by Rpi just the one qubit via
UA that depends on exactly which qubit it is, i.e., on
the exact way Babe chose to purify and/or the exact
|fk〉 she will measure. But if Adam knows which qubit
it is, he could just cheat by declaring a state appropri-
ately different from the original one, e.g., if he sent |3〉
he could declare he sent |1〉 instead. Without knowing
which qubit it is, let m(≤ n) qubits be turned by him,
each by an amount that would be accepted as 1 with
probability p < 1 by Babe upon her verification, while
the other n0 −m become a permutation of the original.
(It can be shown that with his full entanglement, the best
he can do is to turn a small fraction and re-permute the
others, but this result is not needed for the present ar-
gument.) Thus, his probability of successful cheating is
(m/n0)p(1 − p)m−1, the maximum of which over m can
be made arbitrarily small for large n0.
If Babe does not entangle, this protocol is clearly per-
fectly concealing. Since she may be able to cheat with
permutation entanglement, Adam can defeat that as fol-
lows. He sends her originally n ≫ n0 qubits from which
Babe returns n − n0 + 1 qubits. Adam randomly asks
Babe to reveal n − n0 of the returned qubits and check
that they are indeed in states sent by him. The only
entanglement Babe can employ is permutation among
the qubits as she could not respond to Adam perfectly
with additional entanglement. She may entangle a min-
imum of two qubits at a time between one in the set of
n− n0 + 1 elements she sends back to Adam and one in
the set of n0 − 1 elements she keeps, in order to maxi-
mize the probability that the last one retained by Adam
remains entangled to at least one qubit in her possession
for her entanglement cheating. The probability of hav-
ing the entanglement surviving on the one remaining in
Adam’s possession is (n0−1)(n0−n+1)−1, which can be
made arbitrarily small. Hence, P¯Bc <
1
2
+ ǫ for any ǫ and
fixed n0 with large n. This use of n ≫ n0 qubits gives
Adam new possibility of entanglement, which he could
not use under the protocol condition that he has to open
the bit on the one remaining qubit whose name Babe
knows and would verify upon. Thus, we have proved
that the following protocol is ǫ-concealing and ǫ-binding.
PROTOCOL QBC1
(i) Adam sends Babe n qubits, each drawn at ran-
dom from the set S of four BB84 states and
named by its temporal position.
(ii) Babe randomly selects n − n0 + 1 of them and
sends them in a random order back to Adam,
who asks Babe to reveal the names for n − n0
of them. After verifying them, he modulates the
remaining qubit for U0 = I , U1 = Rpi.
(iii) Adam opens by declaring b and the states of all
the n0 remaining qubits; Babe checks by corre-
sponding projective measurements.
To recapitulate the logic of its success, this protocol al-
lows many different purifications by Babe with different
results |Φb〉 and which may not be concealing, so Adam
cannot cheat anyway. However, by checking an ensemble
Adam can force Babe to measure and destroy her en-
tanglement cheating possibility. The resulting protocol
becomes a classically randomized one, in which Adam of
course still cannot cheat.
B. Type 2 protocols — bit-value dependent
evidence state space
As developed in Ref. [19], it is possible to have se-
cure protocols for which the evidence state space HB in
HA ⊗ HB, which is in Babe’s possession at the end of
commitment, depends on the bit b and becomes HB
b
as
it appears to Adam, but is indistinguishable for the two
bit values to Babe. Type 2 protocols are defined to be
those in which Babe sends Adam HB
0
and HB
1
which she
does not need to entangle to her kept spaces although
she may choose to. Adam returns HB
b
to commit b while
keeping the other space. It is distinguished from Type 4
protocols that employ split entangled pairs to individuate
HB
b
, and is easier to implement practically.
Protocol QBC2 goes as follows. Let Babe send Adam
two sets of named states S0 = {φ01, . . . , φ0n}, S1 =
{φ11, . . . , φ1n}, each φbi drawn randomly from the set
S of four BB84 states on a qubit. Adam does not know
and cannot determine perfectly what each state φbi is. To
commit b, he sends back randomly one of φbi, revealing
b and i at opening. In order to cheat, Babe has to dis-
tinguish the two sets S0 and S1 and then measure on the
committed state. It is readily checked that this protocol
is ǫ-concealing for sufficiently large n, such that the four
states in S appear in nearly equal fractions among S0
and S1, even if Babe entangles the states. One may im-
pose the condition that each state in S appears equally
often in S0 and S1, which yields perfect concealing if
Babe does not entangle, but again only ǫ-concealing if
she does. Such a condition may be obtained, e.g., by
sending in n sets of four randomly permuted states in-
stead, with Adam picking one from a set. On the other
8hand, Adam cannot cheat perfectly given that Babe does
not entangle since that does not really help her (or that
she does but with {|fk〉} of (2) unknown to Adam; in the
latter case it shares the feature of QBC4 [19]). For QBC2
we just ake the case Babe does not entangle. If Adam
entangles the φ0i by way of permutations and commits
a qubit H0¯i or his own qubit H0, he could not change
by local transformation the state in H0¯i (or H0) to any
of those in H1i. That is, the state in H0¯i (or H0) is en-
tangled with the states in H0i wherever these states may
go from local transformations. This is because of the
invariance of the position of a qubit within S0 and S1
under entanglement that assures perfect b = 0 opening.
The IP does not apply because UA cannot be determined
without knowing the state of the committed φbi. See the
following Section V for further discussion. Let pA < 1
be Adam’s optimal cheating probability. As usual, this
protocol QBC2.p can be extended to an ǫ-binding one,
QBC2, in an N -sequence, making P¯Ac = p
N
A arbitrarily
small.
PROTOCOL QBC2
(i) Babe sends Adam two m-qubit sets of states, S0
and S1, each state randomly drawn from a fixed
set S of four BB84 states. To commit b, Adam
randomly picks N states, N ≪ m, from Sb and
sends them to Babe.
(ii) Adam opens by revealing b and all the states he
committed; Babe verifies by projective measure-
ments.
C. Type 3 protocols — anonymous states
Type 3 protocols are defined to be those where conceal-
ing is obtained for each of Babe’s possible choices of {λk}
and/or {|fk〉} in (2) at any stage of the protocol. Each
choice thereby results in an anonymous state onHBα⊗HBβ
as it is unknown to Adam. To explain how such a situa-
tion may arise in view of the purification (2), observe that
the unknown |ψk〉 without purification is merely replaced
by the unknown {|fk〉} in (2) even for known {λk}. How
would the other party, say Adam, know {|fk〉}? Babe
can use any orthonormal {|fk〉} without affecting the
protocol security, assuming that the protocol is perfectly
concealing for any orthonormal {|fk〉}, as it usually is.
The Secrecy Principle [18] mentioned above ensures that
Adam cannot demand to know exactly what {|fk〉} Babe
uses in any instance of the protocol execution. As a mat-
ter of fact, in reality (2) may just be an abstract repre-
sentation such that even Babe does not and cannot know
{|fk〉}, as for example when Babe generates the {|ψk〉}
in a classically random fashion. It is clear that IP would
not go through unless Adam’s cheating transformation
UA is independent of {|fk〉}. This issue has not been
examined in the literature, but a proof that such inde-
pendence is obtained was given in Ref. [23] for protocols
that do not involve what we call the switching of evidence
state space that produces the {|fk〉} dependence on UA,
or Babe’s checking over the entire entangled Ubi|Φ〉 upon
verification that makes Theorem 3 of Ref. [23] inappli-
cable. Moving the boundary to further entanglement on
HC does not work because Adam cannot operate on HBβ .
Thus, the proof breaks down in general, and the above
scenario of {|fk〉} dependence of UA with corresponding
Ubi|Ψ〉 verification is carried out for the development of
a secure protocol QBC4.
In the early anonymous-state protocols [17, 22, 23],
the use of b-dependent evidence state spaces has not been
discovered and it was thought that UA is always indepen-
dent of {|fk〉} in (2), even though a proof is only avail-
able for a special class of protocols describe by Ubi|Ψ〉
or Eq. (26) of Ref. [23]. Furtheremore, the use of split
entangled pair verification on Ubi|Ψ〉 has also not been
discovered, and a theorem was proved in Ref. [23] that
UA is independent of {λk} in the perfect concealing case.
The question then becomes whether the {λk} freedom
alone would yield a secure protocol in the ǫ-concealing
case.
It is sometimes argued that such freedom cannot be
automatized and thus cannot lead to a definite QBC pro-
tocol. However, since each party can clearly keep its own
secret mechanism of choosing the {λk}, similar to other
cases of a kept secret in cryptography, this kind of pro-
tocols are perfectly well-defined QBC protocols. In this
connection, one should avoid the confusion between a
probability distribution {λk} and a definitive |Ψ〉 of (2),
and between a random and an unknown parameter. See
[16]-[18] for further elaborations on these points. See also
Ref. [26] for a general classification of many anonymous
states protocols that, however, does not include our four
protocols of this paper.
Even if a theorem is proved with the purification (2)
for any {λk} and a fixed {|fk〉} that says ǫ-concealing
for all {λk} yields a good cheating UA independently of
{λk}, it does not apply to our QBC2 where no {|fk〉} is
used (or equivalently UA needs to succeed for all {|fk〉})
in Adam’s cheating. This is because with known {|fk〉},
Adam does not need to really switch the state from S0 to
S1. Thus, our QBC2 protocol is a Type 3 protocol also if
one observes that Babe can entangle theHBα states {|ψk〉}
with any HBβ state {|fk〉} without affecting ǫ-concealing,
but the cheating UA depends on {|fk〉}.
D. Type 4 protocols — split entangled pair to
individuate evidence space
The use of bit-value dependent evidence state space
leads to ǫ-concealing and ǫ-binding protocol QBC2 de-
scribed above. It is possible to obtain perfectly conceal-
ing protocols when the evidence space is entangled by
Babe, which is indistinguishable to Babe when presented
9to her by Adam as committed evidence. This is described
in Ref. [19] for protocol QBC4. These two protocols, al-
though relying on the same basic idea, illustrate in dif-
ferent ways the diverse manifestation of b-dependent HB
b
and classical randomness in protocol design.
E. Type 5 protocols — utilizing quantum
teleportation
Type 5 protocols are defined to be those where quan-
tum teleportation is utilized during commitment. An
example is a two-stage protocol in which Babe randomly
sends an entangled pair to Adam, who uses it to tele-
port a single possible state |b〉 for each b to one qubit
and sends it to Babe at opening. The Bell measurement
result is committed as evidence. If Babe does not or can-
not entangle, it is readily seen that such a protocol is
perfectly concealing, while Adam cannot cheat perfectly.
If Babe entangles her choice, the protocol can be made
ǫ-concealing if Babe first sends in many qubit pairs. The
resulting protocol QBC5p and its US extension QBC5
are fully described in Ref. [20]. the main reason for the
failure of IP in this case is that Adam’s measurement can-
not be postponed to after commitment while the possible
measurement results cannot be entangled as the actual
reading is the committed evidence.
F. Type 6 protocols — necessary condition on
concealing or binding
Once the freedom of operation is opened up, one may
no longer assume that anything has to be known to both
parties. For example, even in the original IP formula-
tion, one may allow Adam to use different possible {pbi}
in (1). Thus, Babe has to decide on b by some strategy
different from the one that assumes {pbi} are known. The
issue of unknown versus random parameters enters again,
which greatly complicates the situation. It is not clear
how one may formulate necessary conditions for conceal-
ing, or binding, that are needed to yield an impossibility
proof that says if the necessary concealing (or binding)
condition is satisfied, then the protocol cannot be bind-
ing (or concealing). However, it is also not clear how to
formulate a protocol this way that can be proved secure.
We just reserve the name “Type 6 protocols” for this
approach without an example.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have tried to explain and to dissect the various
ways a QBC protocol can be designed, and to show the
many possibilities that the “impossibility proof” formu-
lation misses. Specifically, we list four categories of gaps
and six types of new protocol formulations that exploit
such gaps. In four of these types, there are protocols
QBC1, QBC2, QBC4, and QBC5 that can be proved un-
conditionally secure. This also solves the quantum coin-
tossing problem, in which much work has been done as-
suming secure quantum bit commitment is impossible.
Also, one of our protocols, QBC2, can be readily imple-
mented with coherent states and is close to being practi-
cal even with the limited quantum memory and quantum
communication capabilities we have at present. The chal-
lenge remains to find fully practical, secure QBC schemes
including system imperfections, as well as efficient ways
to utilize them for various cryptographic objectives.
APPENDIX A: PREVIOUS PROTOCOLS
I discuss briefly here the security status of the proto-
cols I previously proposed and claimed unconditionally
secure.
Protocol “QBC2” in Ref. [21], the only one claimed
to be US there, is not proved perfectly concealing be-
cause entanglement cheating by Babe is not accounted
for. It was assumed to be the same as a classically ran-
dom protocol. While a proof is not available, it appears
that the protocol cannot be made perfectly concealing or
ǫ-concealing without allowing Adam to cheat, even with
the modification described in Section 5 of Ref. [18].
Ref. [22] is a preliminary version of Ref. [23], in which
Type 3 protocols are introduced. However, the binding
argument from no-cloning there is not valid. Thus, if
Adam knows the (purified) anonymous state, the proto-
col is insecure due to the fact that all perfectly verifying
measurements under the IP formulation lead to insecure
protocols against a single cheating UA, although that is
a fact not proved in the IP itself. If Adam does not know
the anonymous state, the situation is not yet completely
resolved. However, it appears that Adam can probably
cheat for operator-theoretic reasons on tensor product
spaces, in this case as well as in QBC2.1p of v2 of this
paper.
Protocols “QBC1” in Ref. [16] and “QBC4” in
Ref. [17], as well as the preliminary version of Ref. [21],
involve attemps to force Adam to measure on HA, thus
effectively “destroyng” his entanglement. They fail as
indicated in Section II. However, such an attempt can
succeed when applied to destroy Babe’s entanglement,
in the sense discussed in this paper, which leads to our
present QBC1 that was first briefly discussed in Ref. [18].
The protocol “QBC2” in Ref. [16] and v1 of this paper,
which is a “Type 2” protocol of Ref. [18], protocl “QBC4”
in v1 of Ref. [20], and protocol “QBC5” in v1 of Ref. [19]
are all insecure because they can be brought into the form
of a single |Φb〉 so that IP and the results of Section III
in Ref. [23] apply.
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